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Introduction
The authors of this article teach economics and pub-
lic policy at the University of Chicago,the University
of Minnesota, and Dartmouth College – three of the
finest academic institutions in the United States.Yet,
the authors are precluded by law from teaching eco-
nomics in any public high school in the states of
Illinois, Minnesota or New Hampshire. This would
be a mere curiosity if the same kind of law, occupa-
tional licensure, did not also preclude many low-
skilled workers from entering the labor market to do
the dwindling number of jobs for which they may be
qualified, such as barbering, manicurists or cosme-
tology.Occupational licensure is the legal process by
which governments (mostly the states in the US but
also local governments and the Federal government)
identify the legal qualifications required to become
licensed to practice a trade or profession,after which
only licensed practitioners are allowed by law to re-
ceive pay for doing the work in the occupation.This
form of labor market regulation has rapidly become
one of the most significant factors affecting labor mar-
kets in the United States and other industrialized
countries. The number of persons in licensed profes-
sions in the US has grown from around 4.5 percent in
the early 1950s to about 29 percent in 2009.More than
800 occupations are licensed in at least one state
(Kleiner and Krueger 2009). The trend, in the UK is
broadly similar with a doubling of the number of per-
sons required to hold a license to 13 percent in the last
dozen years (Humphris,Kleiner and Koumenta 2010).
The trend towards broader licensure should be a
source of interest to policymakers, if not outright
concern. Licensure makes it more difficult to enter a
profession,which restrains the supply of service pro-
viders,and can raise demand curve by suggesting the
service is of higher quality. Consequently, this raises
the cost of services for consumers. Similarly, state or
local licensure in the US can diminish mobility by
requiring service providers to fulfill new licensing re-
quirements when they move from one political juris-
diction to another. (For example, a public school
teacher with a decade of experience in New Hamp-
shire is not legally allowed to teach in an Illinois
public school without taking significant new course-
work and meeting state residency requirements). Fi-
nally, licensure restricts mobility and the scope of
practice within certain professions.Dental hygienists
cannot do tasks or open independent offices because
the law restricts the overarching tasks to only dentists;
a registered nurse in a hospital cannot do a task that
state legislators have determined must be carried out
by a licensed respiratory therapist (Wheelan 1998).
Of course, these labor market distortions must be
weighed against any potential gains to consumers
from the quality improvements in the licensed pro-
fession. Yet even the putative benefits of licensure
have come under academic assault. The quality im-
provements of licensure are often overstated and
may even lower the quality of service provided,if,for
example, licensure requirements deter highly pro-
ductive individuals (with the highest opportunity
cost of time) from entering the profession or if the
training mandated by lawmakers has no meaningful
relationship to performance on the job. It should
also be noted that the legislative case for licensure
most often comes from practitioners of the profes-
sion, rather than aggrieved members of the public.
Since the existing practitioners are usually exempted
from the new licensure laws, or “grandfathered”,
they have a powerful incentive to deter competition
by continually ratcheting up the requirements to
enter the profession or to capture work from unreg-
ulated workers by saying the work falls under the
regulations. This was the case in Minnesota where
cosmetologists argued that hair braiding was a form
of cosmetology and therefore could not be practiced
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court to shut down the hair braiding businesses. In
this case, the board was permanently enjoined from
enforcing its cosmetology licensing regime against
hair braiders and it was also required to publish ad-
ministrative rules that exempt hair braiders from
regulation.Licensure laws must be made or repealed
on a case by case basis, with legislators and gover-
nors weighing evidence on potential quality improve-
ments against the costs imposed on workers and con-
sumers. Nonetheless, we will argue that lawmakers in
the US and Europe should take a much closer look at
occupational licensure, a form of “stealth regulation”
that we show is growing at a striking pace,seldom jus-
tified with rigorous economic analysis and often pre-
scribed by self-interested members of the profession
who are, ironically, subsequently exempted from the
expensive training that they have argued is essential
to protect the public.
Economic and public policy rationale for licensure
To the extent that a licensure law improves average
quality in a profession,or merely eliminates the most
egregiously poor or dangerous service providers,
there are several strong theoretical cases in which
licensure laws can improve overall social welfare:
• Danger to third parties: Licensure can provide
some minimum quality service when a poor ser-
vice provider poses harm to innocent third par-
ties.A shoddy electrician can burn down a whole
neighborhood, not merely the house of the con-
sumer who hired him. Similarly, a doctor can fail
to treat a contagious disease properly, creating a
public health risk; an architect or engineer can
design structures that imperil many more people
than the client. However, in some industries such
as aircraft manufacturing the product (aircraft) or
output is heavily regulated,but the engineers who
make the product are not.
• Society’s stake in good service provision: Licens-
ure can potentially improve the quality of service
in cases where consumers are unable to make an
informed decision and society has some stake in
their wellbeing. For example, schoolchildren (and
even their parents in some cases) cannot neces-
sarily recognize incompetent teachers, nor do
they necessarily have redress when they can.The
quality of this education,particularly for the most
disadvantaged children, ultimately has implica-
tions for all of society.
• Paternalism: Licensure can provide a minimum
level of quality when consumers are deemed un-
able to make an informed decision and society
seeks to protect these individuals from themselves.
This situation is distinct from the cases above in
two respects. First, there is no obvious public cost
that results from a poor decision on the part of an
individual; this is a matter of society’s collective
judgment overriding a personal decision. Second,
this rationale for licensure is obviously dependent
on one’s political ideology, as it turns on the indi-
vidual’s right to make a “bad”decision (in contrast
to hiring an incompetent electrician who burns
down the neighborhood, which even the most
devout libertarian would have a hard time defend-
ing as a basic right).
It is crucial to note here that providing information
for prospective consumers on service quality is not
an economically sound rationale for professional
licensure. Licensure proponents often argue, right-
fully,that consumers have a hard time discerning the
quality of a service provider ex ante, either because
consumers lack the requisite expertise or because
the information is costly to acquire.This information
asymmetry can be solved with a less intrusive form
of professional regulation known as certification.
The government (or any other objective, informed
third party) can define the necessary standards or
training in a given profession and then “certify”
those who are deemed qualified.The key difference
from licensure, however, is that consumers are free
to hire non-certified service providers. There is an
important potential market feedback; if consumers
perceive that certification provides meaningful in-
formation on quality, then they will be willing to pay
a premium for certified service providers.This will in
turn induce more professionals to seek certification.
However, if certification is not associated with high-
er quality by consumers,then they will not pay a pre-
mium for it, and service providers will not spend
time or money to seek it.Over time,certification will
thrive where it provides valuable information and
disappear where it does not.This is in sharp contrast
to licensure, where producers must become licensed
(and therefore consumers must hire a licensed ser-
vice provider ) because it is the only legal option and
carries with it the weight of the police powers of the
state, regardless of the relationship, or lack thereof,
between the licensure process and service quality.
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Potential costs and concerns
As with any form of regulation, policymakers must
weigh the potential benefits of professional licensure
against the costs of the subsequent labor market dis-
tortions.There are numerous potential drawbacks to
licensure, even in cases where such regulation
improves quality in the relevant profession:
• Too much quality:Not all consumers demand the
same level of quality.When members of the legal
profession told Milton Friedman that every
lawyer should be a Cadillac, he famously replied
that many people would be better off with a
Chevy (a cheaper but purely functional alterna-
tive). If licensure improves quality by restricting
entry into the profession, then some consumers
will be forced to pay for more “quality” than they
want or need, or they may not be able to afford
any service at all (Friedman 1962). Even in pro-
fessions such as law or medicine that require grad-
uate education, many services are quite basic (e.g.,
drawing up a will or giving a flu shot). Estimates
show that occupational licensing raises the wages
of licensed practitioners in the US by about 15 per-
cent and around 13 percent in the UK (Kleiner
and Krueger 2009; Humphris, Kleiner and Kou-
menta 2010). For that reason, there are income
inequality considerations related to who gains
and who loses as the result of licensure. In a mo-
del developed by Carl Shapiro (1986) high in-
come consumers gain at the expense of lower in-
come consumers with a preference for lower qual-
ity service. When licensure is introduced, more
producers choose to be high quality, raising out-
put in the high-quality market and lowering
prices for consumers who seek high quality.These
consumers are better off in the new steady state
because they consume the same high-quality ser-
vice at a lower price.Consumers who prefer lower
quality services are worse off since these services
are only available at a higher price than in an unli-
censed market, or not at all. Thus, licensing can
have a reverse “Robin Hood Effect” by making
higher income consumers better off at the ex-
pense of lower income consumers.
• Higher costs can cause dangerous substitutions:
Bad things happen when people decide to pull
their own teeth. Consumers who cannot afford
licensed professionals have an incentive to do the
work themselves – sometimes at great cost to
themselves or the public (Kleiner 2006).
• Minimal or no impact on quality: Licensure re-
quires that new entrants to a profession under-
take specified training, pass a particular exam or
fulfill some combination thereof.Any potential be-
nefit of licensure depends entirely on the connec-
tion between these requirements and subsequent
quality of service.Often there is none.One striking
example comes from teachers in Los Angeles.Cali-
fornia passed a law placing a cap on class sizes
throughout the state. Los Angeles was not able to
hire enough certified teachers to fill the open posi-
tions.To meet the demand,the district hired thou-
sands of teachers who were not certified or who
were in the process of becoming certified but had
not yet fulfilled all the state requirements. Sub-
sequent analysis of classroom-level data for
150,000 students over multiple years found that
teacher quality did in fact have a profound impact
on student performance but that there was no sta-
tistical association between whether a teacher
was certified and his or her performance in the
classroom (Gordon, Kane and Staiger 2006).The
authors conclude,“To put it simply, teachers vary
considerably in the extent to which they promote
student learning, but whether a teacher is certi-
fied or not is largely irrelevant to predicting his or
her effectiveness”. This is consistent with many
other findings. For example tougher laws for den-
tistry had no impact on the quality received by
patients who were Air Force recruits or on other
more general measures of quality (Kleiner and
Kudrle 2000).Also, having tougher licensing laws
for mortgage brokers did not reduce the number
of foreclosures, but did raise the prices of mort-
gages in more heavily regulated states (Kleiner
and Todd 2009).
• Creates labor market barriers for disadvantaged
populations: Many licensed professions are rela-
tively low-skilled jobs, such as barbers, mani-
curists, nurse’s aides and cosmetologists. While
the social costs of a bad haircut would appear to
be negligible,the social costs of creating addition-
al employment barriers for disadvantaged popu-
lations are most certainly not. For example, licen-
sure laws often exclude ex-felons, which is defen-
sible in many professions,but can also make it ex-
tremely difficult for ex-offenders to find post-
prison employment,thereby contributing to Amer-
ica’s high recidivism rate.
• Reduces mobility within fields: The proliferation
of licensure can raise costs and reduce flexibility
in the affected occupations. For example, licen-
sure can make it illegal for an 8th grade math
teacher to switch to the 9th grade (because mid-
dle school licensure is different than high school)or for dental hygienists to offer basic dental care
without the supervision of a dentist. This profes-
sional fragmentation is particularly acute in
health care, where more than 76 percent of non-
physicians are licensed (Kleiner and Park 2010)
and where there are rigidly defined roles that pre-
vent individuals from moving across jobs or from
performing multiple tasks.
• Promotes and rewards “rent-seeking”:History (going
back to medieval guilds),theory and data all suggest
that producers have a strong incentive to create bar-
riers to entry for their professions in order to raise
wages. For example, a study of licensed and unli-
censed professions in Illinois found that a profes-
sion’s political organization is positively associated
with the likelihood of becoming licensed, holding
constant the risk that the profession poses to the
public (as reflected in liability premiums) (Wheelan
1998).Meanwhile,the consumers who will be affect-
ed by the higher costs associated with licensure are
unorganized and arguably underrepresented in the
political process. The willingness of a legislature to
pass licensure laws without rigorous analysis creates
the opportunity and incentive for well-organized
producer groups to use the process for personal gain.
Of course,any of these drawbacks is particularly per-
nicious when the relevant licensure law has no im-
pact on service quality in the profession. An absurd
example perhaps makes the case best. Suppose that
prospective teachers in a given state were required
to run a mile in under six minutes in order to become
licensed. The supply of teachers would be limited;
wages for existing teachers would go up;some of the
best potential educators would be deterred from
entering the profession; there would be no quality
improvement from having speedy well-conditioned
teachers and a likely adverse impact on quality from
wrongly screening out those who would have done
well in the classroom.
Questions and recommendations for policymakers
Occupational licensure, like most forms of regula-
tion, is neither inherently good nor bad. It is a tool
with the potential to protect society from dangerous
service providers (and the consumers who hire
them); the same tool can distort labor markets in
ways such that the social costs far outweigh the ben-
efits. Legislators in the US or Europe ought to con-
sider the following questions when considering licen-
sure policies (when expanding licensure to addition-
al professions, having licensed occupations capture
the tasks of unregulated occupations or in those rare
cases when rolling back such regulations):
What is the goal of the policy? Legislators ought to
distinguish between policies that seek to upgrade av-
erage quality in the profession, which often requires
extensive training for new entrants, and those that
seek to screen out the worst or most dangerous ser-
vice providers.The latter can often be accomplished
at relatively low cost with a simple task-based exam,
a criminal background check,a basic safety course or
some other mechanism that sorts the worst from the
rest. As noted earlier in the paper, if the goal is to
provide information for consumers who might not
otherwise be able to discern quality,then licensure is
not necessary at all.The government (or other cred-
ible entity) can offer certification instead. A certifi-
cation program defines quality and identifies those
who achieve it; consumers are free to hire certified
professionals or not.
Will the proposed licensure measures achieve the
stated goal? The policy arguments for licensure are
too often presented as follows: a) Dangerous or
incompetent service providers in this profession can
cause harm; b) Society would be better off if this
harm were eliminated; c) Therefore we ought to
license this profession. Frequently the process does
not close the logical loop by asking the final question
(let alone presenting data to answer it): Will the li-
censure requirements that we are proposing have
the intended effect on quality? Or will the experts,
who are members of the regulated occupation,mere-
ly restrict entry without appreciably enhancing the
health and safety of the community? Analysis across
a wide range of professions suggests that the overall
effect is to restrict entry and drive up wages with lit-
tle to no influence on quality.
What will be the impact of licensure on the cost and
availability of service provision? Higher quality will
usually come at a cost; that cost is not likely to be
spread uniformly across the population. Low income
consumers may be disproportionately impacted by
reduced access to services and rising costs. To para-
phrase Milton Friedman,when every service provider
becomes a Cadillac,some consumers are going to end
up with no car at all. There is likely to be a redistri-
bution effect in the “wrong” direction, as higher in-
come consumers have more choice among higher qua-
lity purveyors of a service and lower income individu-
als are left with fewer affordable service options.
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Is this the least costly approach? If there is an un-
equivocal demand for some increase in the quality of
service provision,then policymakers ought to ensure
that level of quality with a policy that generates the
fewest concomitant costs. Consider a policy to en-
sure some minimum level of competency for persons
operating some kind of machinery that has the
potential to injure innocent passersby if used im-
properly.The government can require a certain set of
courses in order to become licensed; it could require
passing a practical exam;or it could do both.The least
costly approach is the exam only, which measures
quality directly (assuming the test is well construct-
ed) rather than specifying inputs and has the lowest
opportunity cost for high quality applicants (such as
practitioners already licensed in other states, indi-
viduals who have operated similar machinery, fast
learners, and so on). After all, even if one were to
require that all practitioners in a specific profession
be able to run a six-minute mile, it is still more effi-
cient to simply test them in a mile run than it is to
make them take a one-semester running class and
then do the mile test!
Are consumers asking for this protection? If the an-
swer is no, then there may not be a problem that
needs solving.One ought to be naturally wary of pro-
ducer groups that present evidence on how poten-
tially harmful they are to the public while simultane-
ously arguing that all existing practitioners of this dan-
gerous profession be exempted from the proposed
licensure requirements.
Conclusions
Each profession requires a case-by-case judgment
based on the particular economic costs and benefits
of licensure.However,the extant licensure literature
suggests two simple but powerful guides for policy-
makers. First, academic evidence suggests that the
burden of proof should be on those seeking licen-
sure. Evidence of poor quality in a given profession
is not sufficient to justify licensure. Those seeking
licensure should have to provide compelling evi-
dence that: 1) The proposed legislation would ame-
liorate the quality problem; and 2) The social costs
imposed in the process are not unduly burdensome.
Second,there is no intellectual justification for grand-
fathering existing service providers. If there is a legisla-
tively-imposed quality improvement for which the
benefits exceed the costs, then it ought to be imposed
on all current and future practitioners of the profes-
sion, presumably with some phase-in period for exist-
ing practitioners.In cases where past work experience
might reasonably demonstrate some competence,
then the same exemption should be offered to practi-
tioners who have plied their trade in other states or
countries (e.g. teachers with private school experi-
ence) or can somehow demonstrate the same experi-
ence-based competence.In cases where existing licen-
sure requirements are being strengthened to reflect a
rising expectation of quality, then existing practition-
ers should be expected to upgrade their skills as well.
(After all, the whole point of this “ratcheting up” is
that the training requirements used to train current
practitioners are no longer sufficient.) If licensure re-
quirements are imposed on all practitioners, rather
than on new entrants exclusively, then licensure laws
are less likely to be politically engineered by rent-
seeking producer groups.
Occupational licensure has a large and growing im-
pact on labor markets without attracting significant
public attention or scrutiny. Policymakers ought to
revisit the process for creating licensure law and con-
sider amending or rolling back existing laws.
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